“ASIC concluded that reasonable investigations into the recommended financial products or any alternatives to them were not conducted, and that the clients’ relevant personal circumstances were not considered”
— McEvoy J, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Dixon Advisory & Superannuation Services Limited [2022] FCA 1105 at 29
If you believe Michelle Levy, the Best Interests Duty is an unnecessary and burdensome imposition on advisers and one that provides little benefit to consumers.
In reality, it is a necessary and desirable component of professional practice.
In fact, the recent case of ASIC v Dixon Advisory and Superannuation Services Limited (“Dixon”) highlights both the duty and the significant consequences that licensees may be exposed to as a result of their authorised representatives contravening the duty and failing to provide appropriate advice.
The factual background
Dixon held an AFSL and carried on a financial services business. During the material period, authorised representatives of Dixon provided personal advice to eight retail clients, generally in their capacity as trustees and members of self-managed superannuation funds (SMSF).
- Dixon’s representatives recommended that those clients invest in or retain an existing interest in units issued by the US Masters Residential Property Fund. The risks associated with these units included the fact they were unsecured, the potential for the interest on the notes not to be paid or the face value not to be repaid, risks inherent in the nature of the business undertaken (acquiring, leasing and selling properties in the United States), and the market for the notes being highly illiquid.
- It was accepted by the parties to this case that these risks made an investment in the units highly risky. In some instances, the client’s SMSF portfolios consisted of a quarter to a third of the units.
- In providing the advice the representatives were implementing an advice process established by Dixon which recommended financial products for clients based on standard parameters and the clients’ Dixon risk profile. The units in question were included in Dixon’s approved product list.
- Due to the process by which these recommendations were provided, and the risks associated with the units, it was accepted by all parties to this case that the advice was in breach of the Best Interests Duty under section 961B of the Corporations Act and the appropriate advice duty under section 961G of the Corporations Act. It was agreed that having regard to the client’s personal and relevant circumstances, their SMSFs were insufficiently diversified, and exposed to an inappropriate risk of capital loss.
Let’s pause here. It is useful to consider this aspect of the case in light of the Quality of Advice Review.
Read the Judgment
The Levy proposition
In the Quality of Advice Review Consultation Paper (“Proposals for Reform”) dated August 2022, Ms Levy proposes repealing the Best Interests Duty, the appropriate advice duty, the duty to warn the client and the duty of priority in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act. As a better approach, she proposed replacing these obligations with a ‘good advice’ duty.
‘Good advice’ meaning advice that would be reasonably likely to benefit the client, having regard to the information that is available to the provider at the time the advice is provided.
We made our position clear in our submission to Treasury, it is the safe-harbour steps (and not the Best Interests Duty) that need to be repealed and this approach is, in our view, better aligned with the Review’s observation that: …by focussing on the quality of the advice given, the law does not need to regulate or prescribe the inputs. It is this premise which underpins the proposals…”
Furthermore, Ms Levy criticises the substantive value of the best interests by observing that:
“…if you thought the clues were in the language of acting in the client’s interests, the safe harbour steps suggest otherwise. These steps are the steps a careful adviser might take in discharging their duty of care. They have nothing to say about acting without a conflict or not taking an unauthorised profit and so one may wonder in what way the formulation in Chapter 7 is fiduciary-like”
The Quality of Advice Review criticizes the best interests duty as being:
- Too prescriptive,
- Too onerous on the advisor, and
- Lacking in substantive value.
It’s important to be clear; although the Dixon case provides ample evidence that a formulaic, prescriptive and mechanical approach to the Best Interests Duty is fraught with the risk of failing that duty, we should abandon the formulaic, prescriptive and mechanical approach to the Best Interests Duty but not the duty to act in a client’s best interests.
However, we must ask: what does the Best Interests Duty actually require?
The Best Interests Duty
Section 961B(1) of the Corporations Act provides that, in relation to an advice provider giving personal advice “(1) The provider must act in the best interests of the [retail] client in relation to the [personal] advice.”
This obligation is generally referred to as the ‘Best Interests Duty’.
The Safe Harbour Steps
“Allowing advisers to adopt a ’tick a box’ approach to compliance… has the potential to undermine the broader obligation for advisers to act in the best interests of their clients.”
— Final Report “Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry” Page 177
Sections 961B(2)(a)-(g) of the Corporations Act contain several “safe harbour” steps which, if performed, will deem that you have acted in the client’s best interests. However, explicitly demonstrating that all the safe harbour steps have been performed is not the only way to discharge the Best Interests Duty. This is affirmed by the Revised Explanatory Memorandum (Memorandum) which accompanied the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012, which provides:
“1.21 The [Best Interests Duty] is supplemented by a provision setting out steps that, if the provider can prove they have taken, will be taken to satisfy the [Best Interests Duty].
These steps have been set out based on the specific conditions under which advisers currently operate…”
“The steps set out in subsection 961B(2) are not intended to be an exhaustive and mechanical checklist of what it is to act in the best interests of the client. A provider may be able to demonstrate that it has, in fact, acted in the best interests of the client under subsection (1), without having recourse to subsection (2)”
This is affirmed by ASIC Regulatory Guide 175 (RG 175), which provides: “Showing that all of the elements in s961B(2) have been met is one way for an advice provider to satisfy the duty in s961B(1). However, it is not the only way.”
Clearly, the best interests duty does not require that the provider of the advice complies with, or ‘ticks off’ the safe harbour steps.
Discharging the Best Interests Duty
“Best interests” is itself not defined in the Act. However, section 961E provides that:
“It would reasonably be regarded as in the best interests of the client to take a step, if a person with a reasonable level of expertise in the subject matter of the advice that has been sought by the client, exercising care and objectively assessing the client’s relevant circumstances, would regard it as in the best interests of the client, given the client’s relevant circumstances, to take that step”
In view of the above, the Best Interests Duty requires that, at the time of the advice, the provider:
- Exercises care in objectively assessing the client’s circumstances (free from conflicts of interest); and
- Forms a reasonable belief that the client would be in a better position if they implemented the advice.
It is somewhat strange that the Quality of Advice Review refers to the ‘safe harbour steps’ in its characterisation of the substantive content of the Best Interests Duty yet fails to mention section 961E.
Interestingly, Ms Levy avoids the substantive duty and asserts that: “…a more direct and better way to regulate the provision of advice is to start precisely where the current regime does not – with the content of the advice. Consumers want good advice – not documents and processes. And advice can be more easily measured and assessed than conduct.”
We fundamentally disagree with this proposition. In our experience, it is easier to assess conduct than quality (and assessing quality requires a consideration of more than the context in which advice is provided).
Our question is, how do we measure the quality of the content of the advice at the time it was provided without considering either the provider’s process or intent?
This fundamental question is never addressed in the Quality of Advice Review.
Instead, Ms Levy declares that: “What is good advice can and should be measured objectively in light of the relevant circumstances at the time the advice is given”
Respectfully, the Best Interests Duty already does this (and more). In addition to requiring the consideration of intent, needs and likely outcomes it necessarily encompasses an obligation to provide appropriate advice and prioritise clients’ interests.
The scope of the duty
In our view, the Best Interests Duty is neither overly-prescriptive nor mechanical. It is a substantive commitment to professional conduct that necessarily involves the relegation of self-interest and the deliberate consideration of appropriate practices and likely outcomes.
It is more than the self-regulation of personal interests, conflicts and convenience. More than intent, complying with the duty requires an expert and objective consideration of a client’s circumstances, and the development of solutions and strategies likely to satisfy the client’s needs and improve their circumstances. It is flexible enough to be applied in trying times, such as during the beginning of a global pandemic, when advisers were required to make decisions in uncertain circumstances.
The Duty is not the problem. It’s the ineffective and legalistic operationalisation of the best interests and the attempt to industrialise and mechanise the reflective professional process that causes the problem.
This is precisely what occurred in the Dixon case.
What did the Court conclude?
Dixon was held liable for the contraventions of it’s authorised representatives in accordance with section 961K of the Corporations Act.
In handing down judgment, Justice McEvoy remarked;
“There is no evidence that the (Dixon) representatives conducted the necessary reasonable investigations into the recommended financial products or any alternative financial products, nor is there evidence that they considered the personal circumstances of the client”
The parties to this case, that is ASIC and Dixon, agreed that an aggregate penalty of $7.2million for the 53 contraventions was appropriate. This penalty was a pecuniary penalty and therefore was a penalty ordered as a general deterrent in the public interest.
Specifically, Justice McEvoy stated: “I accept that [Dixon’s] contraventions of…the Act with respect to the best interests obligations during the Relevant Period requires a significant penalty in light of the circumstances and in the interests of deterrence”
Dixon, ASIC and Justice McEvoy all agreed in the Federal Court that contraventions of the Best Interests obligations were so detrimental to the public interest that it was appropriate for a multi-million dollar penalty to be ordered, approximately three weeks after the Quality of Advice Review was delivered.
Is “good advice” the solution to poor process?
The Quality of Advice Review states that ‘good advice’ is advice that would be reasonably likely to benefit the client, having regard to the information that is available to the provider at the time the advice is provided.
What does ‘reasonably likely to benefit’ actually mean?
It may be interpreted to mean a possibility that is ‘reasonable’, and not even probable. That is to say, if there is a reason to substantiate the possibility that the advice will benefit the client this will be sufficient.
The ‘good advice’ duty is further qualified as being based upon ‘information that is available to the provider at the time’. Would this not also require advisors consider alternative available products? And if not, what would it require? That advisors only consider products where they have information about those products at hand?
Based upon the above interpretation, advisers will satisfy the good advice duty by recommending products they believe might benefit their clients. The recommended products could potentially be selected from a list of pre-determined products that are not compared with alternatives.
Yet the Quality of Advice Review states that the ‘good advice’ obligation will lead to better quality personal advice than advice that is in the client’s best interests, an apparent non sequitur.
- Would a “good advice duty” have prevented the misconduct evident in the Dixon case from occurring?
- More importantly, would the “good advice duty” have facilitated (or concealed) the misconduct?
- Would a significantly lower standard (“good advice”) simply reduce accountability for conflicted product distribution?
We’ve previously suggested that Ms Levy’s proposals are more aligned with the interests of product issuers than professional advisers. Advice professionals will always follow a process to arrive at their conclusions; and this is to their benefit as much as to their clients’ benefit. While repealing the mechanistic and industrialised safe-harbour steps (that were initially demanded to protect institutional licensees) would provide an immediate benefit, replacing a clear duty (best interests) with a vague label (“good advice”) will, in our view, impose a solution that is more placebo than panacea.
On balance, we don’t anticipate the sudden death of the Best Interests Duty.